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Abstract—The domain name system (DNS) is an important
protocol in today’s Internet operation, and is the standard
naming convention between domain names, names that are easy
to read, understand, and remember by humans, to IP address
of Internet resources. The wealth of research activities on DNS
in general and security and privacy in particular suggest that
all problems in this domain are solved. Reality however is that
despite the large body of literature on various aspects of DNS,
there are still many challenges that need to be addressed. In this
paper, we review the various activities in the research community
on DNS operation, security, and privacy, and outline various
challenges and open research directions that need to be tackled.
Index Terms—DNS, Security, Privacy, Analysis, Modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the domain name system (DNS) in
1983 [1], there has been a large body of work on understanding
its operation, security, and privacy. Issues as understanding
the DNS ecosystem[2], [3], [4], [5], resolvers behavior [6],
[7], [8], security issues of resolution[9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
applications for malicious actors detection and profiling[14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], DNS privacy[21], [22], [23],
[24], [25], [18], [26], etc. have been widely researched.
The large body of literature on DNS operation, security,
and privacy suggests that the area is mature, and problems
are well understood. However, reality is contrary to this
suggestion. Recently, adversaries have become very “creative”
about the way they use DNS for launching attacks, moving
from simple to sophisticated usage [28], [29]. The DNS
ecosystem has evolved to include many players, such as open
DNS resolvers, which include trusted, untrusted, and semi-
trusted ones, making it very difficult to reason about its
resolution and operation. The rise of nation-state adversaries,
with their unique capabilities compared to typical adversaries
(ISP-level of an individual malicious actor) call for the further
understanding of how they can affect the operation of the
Internet in general, and DNS in particular [30].
Despite the large body of work on DNS, the rise of new
attacks suggests that DNS operation, security, and privacy
are still one of the significant areas to explore with various
issues to address. Those issues are not necessarily new, like
addressing pervasive adversaries, privacy, and new forms of
attacks, but could be issues to do with problems already
explored in the past: as the behavior of DNS users (benign and
malicious) evolves over time, this calls for further exploration
to incorporate such behavior in characterizing, identifying, and
detecting misuse. As new entities and operational realities and
functions get incorporated in the DNS system, their role and
how they affect end-to-end guarantees, and services built on
top of DNS, need to be understood.
Believing in the important role that it plays today and will
play the future, we set out to present the current opportunities
and challenges of DNS. We summarize all of the major thrusts
of research on the topic and explore some of our ongoing
research activities, highlighting some challenges, and call on
the community to help address them.
Organization. In II we introduce the research opportunities.
In III we introduce various challenges and directions. In IV
we introduce concluding remarks.
II. A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
We review various avenues of research uncovered in the
rich literature on DNS. The main objective of this review
is to highlight DNS security and privacy, with the secondary
objective being the operation of DNS. We focus on research
for understanding the DNS ecosystem (II-A), DNS security
(II-B) and DNS privacy (II-C).
A. DNS Economics and System Analysis
The role that each entity plays, including clients and re-
solvers, and how these roles interact is the determinant factor
for understanding the DNS ecosystem and its various pieces of
complex infrastructure. In the following, we review two crucial
areas that have been explored on that front which includes
understanding the behavior of DNS and DNS blocking.
Understanding DNS Behavior. Callahan et al. [8] passively
monitored DNS and related traffic within a local network to
understand server behavior. Shcomp et al. [6] presented a
characterization of DNS clients for developing an analytical
model of client interactions with the larger DNS ecosystem.
Banse et al. [31] studied the feasibility of behavior-based
tracking in a real-world setting. Schomp et al. [32] presented
methodologies for efficiently discovering the complex client-
side DNS infrastructure. They further developed measurement
techniques for isolating the behavior of the distinct actors in
the infrastructure. Shulman and Waidner [33] explored name
servers that use server-side caching, characterized the opera-
tors of the server-side caching resolvers and their motivations.
Hao et al. [34] explored the behavioral properties of domains
using the DNS infrastructure associated with the domain and
the DNS lookup patterns from networks who are looking up
the domains initially. Behavior-based tracking is a threat, al-
lowing attackers to track users passively. Multiple sessions of a
user are linked exploiting characteristic patterns gathered from
network traffic. For user’s privacy, daily changing IP addresses
offer limited protection against behavior-based tracking. Thus,
lightweight methods that help to prevent profiling and tracking
users without their consent are needed.
DNS Blocking. Thomas et al. [35] examined the NXD (Non-
eXistent Domain) request patterns observed at the root and
recursive name servers to gauge the effectiveness of collision
blocking techniques. Scaife et al. [36] presented an anony-
mous domain registrar. Appelbaum and Muffett [37] proposed
blocking special queries (i.e.,.onion) to improve Tor’s privacy.
DNS blocking has a limitation. In order to ensure DNS privacy,
blocking should be implemented at once. However, it is almost
impossible for all browsers and recursive resolvers to perform
blocking simultaneously. Understanding how blocking may
affect users who are not performing blocking but are sharing
the same DNS infrastructure is required.
B. DNS Security
DNS security is one of the well-explored areas in the
literature, where work has been focused on analyzing and
detecting DNS vulnerabilities and malicious domains. We
review some of the outstanding work on each of these topics.
DNS Vulnerability. Schomp et al. [38] measured vulnerabil-
ity to DNS record injection attacks and found that record injec-
tion vulnerabilities are fairly common even years after some of
them were first uncovered. Dagon et al. [39] documented how
attackers are using “rogue” DNS servers to create malicious
DNS resolution paths, showing dozens of viruses that corrupt
resolution paths and noting hundreds of URLs discovered per
week that performed drive-by alterations of host DNS settings.
Xu et al. [40] quantitatively analyzed several techniques for
hiding malicious DNS activities. Jackson et al. [41] evaluated
the cost-effectiveness of mounting DNS rebinding attacks.
Schomp et al. [42] addressed vulnerabilities in shared DNS
resolvers by removing them entirely and leaving recursive
resolution to clients, showing that the cost of this approach is
modest and arguing that it strengthens the DNS by reducing
the attack surface. Dagon et al. [43] proposed a technique
to make DNS queries more resistant to poisoning attacks.
Chen et al. [44] proposed a lightweight DNS record’s TTL
optimization for consistency. Despite such work, extending the
literature for user-intention-based anomaly detection method
to identify anomalous DNS traffic is an open challenge.
Detecting Malicious Domain Names. Various works have
been proposed for detecting malicious domain names using
DNS behavioral profiling [15], [45], [46], [47], [34], [48],
[49], [50], [39]. For example, Antonakakis et al. [15] pro-
posed a novel detection system called Kopis for detecting
malware-related domain names by passively monitoring DNS
traffic at the upper levels of the DNS hierarchy. Johnes
et al. [47] presented techniques for detecting unauthorized
DNS root servers on the Internet using primarily endpoint-
based measurements. Yadav et al. [51] developed a method to
detect domain fluxes in DNS traffic by looking for patterns
inherent to domain names that are generated algorithmically.
Antonakakis et al. [17] suggested a dynamic reputation system
for DNS called Notos, which uses passive DNS query data
and analyzes the network and zone features of domains to
indicate if a new domain is malicious or legitimate. Gao
et al. [7] presented an innovative approach to detect previ-
ously unknown malicious domains by simply using temporal
correlation in DNS queries. Szurdi et al. [52] performed a
comprehensive study of “typosquatting” (i.e., the deliberate
registration of domains containing typos) within the .com
TLD, showing typo domains identified by lexical analysis
are truly typographical variants of their target domain names.
Despite such measures, the integrity and availability of Internet
communication rely on replies from the DNS root name
servers. Thus, it is important to detect DNS root manipulation
when it does occur, even though it is rare.
Modeling adversaries. There have been some works mod-
eling DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions)
adversaries, such as Bau and Mitchell [53] who formally mod-
eled the cryptographic operations in DNSSEC and discovered
a forgery vulnerability. Herzberg et al. [11] presented a com-
prehensive overview of challenges and pitfalls of DNSSEC,
including vulnerable configurations, interoperability of incre-
mental deployment, and challenges due to super-sized DNS
responses. Although DNSSEC deployment is still very limited,
it has already been abused in several of the largest DoS attacks.
These attacks often deter domains from deploying DNSSEC.
Goldberg et al. [9] demonstrated that since current DNSSEC
deployments with support for NSEC and/or NSEC3 are vul-
nerable to zone enumeration attacks, they proposed a new
cryptographic construction called NSEC5–which proved to be
a secure DNSSEC denial-of-existence mechanism. DNSSEC
does not protect against denial of service attacks. DNSSEC
makes DNS vulnerable to a new type of denial of service
attacks based on cryptographic operations against security-
aware resolvers and name servers, as an attacker can attempt
to use DNSSEC mechanisms to consume victim’s resources.
C. DNS Privacy
DNS privacy is quickly becoming one of the most emergent
issues in the DNS research community. Despite the large body
of the literature on this problem, including but not limited
to: (i) quantification of DNS privacy leakage (ii) designs to
improve privacy (iii) DNS encryption as a vehicle to improve
privacy, and (iv) various standard body activities, many in
the academic research community are still doubtful about the
privacy risks in DNS [54]. Notwithstanding such doubts, we
review prior work on DNS privacy and open directions.
Quantifying DNS Leakage. Konings et al. [55] collected a
one-week dataset of multicast domain name system (mDNS)
announcements at a university and showed that queries and
device names leak plenty of information about users. Krishnan
et al. [18] demonstrated privacy leakage by prefetching and
showed that it is possible to infer the likelihood of search
terms issued by clients by analyzing the context obtained from
the prefetching queries. Zhao et al. [27] analyzed the complete
DNS query process and discussed privacy disclosure problems
in each step: client-side, query transmission process, and DNS
server-side. They proposed a privacy-preserving query scheme
called “Range Query”, which decreases privacy disclosure in
the whole DNS query process. Paxson et al. [14] developed a
measurement procedure to limit the amount of information
a domain can receive surreptitiously through DNS queries
to an upper bound specified by a security policy, with the
exact setting representing a tradeoff between the scope of
potential leakage versus the quantity of possible detections.
Castillo-Perez and Garcia-Alfaro [26] evaluated DNS privacy-
preserving approaches, and pointed out the necessity of ad-
ditional measures to enhance their security. When mobile
devices are operated in public wireless networks, current im-
plementations pose several privacy risks. The default naming
practices of devices names need to be revised and users need to
be able to limit service discovery to a selected set of networks.
Designs for Improving Privacy. Due to the ubiquity of pri-
vacy risks, efforts are constantly being made in both academia
and industry for preserving privacy in DNS communications.
Zhao et al. [27] propose to ensure the DNS privacy by
concealing the actual queries using noisy traffic. Noisy traffic
increases of latency and bandwidth during the execution and
resolution of queries. Castillo-Perez et al. [26] evaluated this
approach and demonstrated that the privacy ensured by added
queries is somewhat difficult to analyze and that the technique
introduces additional latency and overhead, making it less
practical. An extended algorithm to ensure privacy, while
improving performance, is also introduced by Castillo-Perez et
al. [26] which uses both noisy traffic and private information
retrieval (PIR) techniques. They pointed out to serious security
flaws on both proposals if active attackers can target those
mechanisms. These flaws on an improved method of the two
proposals still require additional improvements to be effective.
Techniques which employ certain flavors of encryption have
also been studied. For example, Herrmann et al. [56] pro-
posed a lightweight privacy-preserving implementation called
EncDNS which essentially replaces third-party resolvers and
provides client software that forwards queries to it through
conventional DNS forwarders. Since EncDNS provides an
end-to-end encryption, forwarders will not know the contents
of the queries. Lu and Tsudik [57] proposed a Privacy-
Preserving DNS (PPDNS) built on top of a distributed hash
tables (DHTs) and computational PIR to obtain a reasonably
high level of privacy for name resolution queries.
DNS Encryption. As mentioned previously, Herrmann et
al. [56] presented a novel lightweight privacy-preserving name
resolution service called EncDNS to serve as a replacement
for conventional third-party resolvers. The EncDNS protocol,
which is based on DNSCurve, encapsulates encrypted mes-
sages in standards-compliant DNS messages. Zhu et al. [21]
proposed T-DNS to address privacy leakage problems us-
ing transport-layer security (TLS) to enable a user’s privacy
against their DNS resolvers and optionally the authoritative
servers. Shulman [24] extensively explored dependencies in
DNS and showed that an attacker can learn the requested
domain in an encrypted DNS packet when information leakage
via transitive trust is applied in tandem with other side-
channels. Ateniese et al. [12] introduced a new strategy to
build chains of trust from root servers to authoritative servers.
End-to-end encryption has high overhead that needs to be
mitigated. Besides, DNSSEC is not widely deployed yet even
though DNS names are used for authentication. Thus, protec-
tions need to utilize encryption together with other methods
such as DNSSEC, query name minimization, etc.
Modeling DNS Adversaries. While much of the previous
work has focused on various aspects of DNS security and
privacy, including (data-driven) modeling and informal de-
scription [23] and informal adversaries modeling on confi-
dentiality [30], there is no study that formalizes adversaries
against confidentiality, let alone concretely evaluating them.
Standards. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
has recently established a working group dedicated solely to
addressing DNS privacy concerns (DNS PRIVate Exchange,
DPRIVE). This working group has proposed various tech-
niques that are currently being under consideration [23]. Zhu
et al. [58] (based on [21]) proposed a connection-oriented
DNS transport over TCP, which uses TLS for privacy. The
authors argue that the overhead of their approach is modest
with careful implementations. Reddy et al. [59] proposed
to use the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for
DNS exchange. They add a protection layer for the sensitive
information in DNS queries, which would withstand a passive
listener and certain active attackers. To address side-channel
attacks on encrypted DNS, Mayrhofer [60] proposed a padding
scheme, where servers pad requests and responses by a vari-
able number of octets. DNS over TLS does not consider known
attacks on TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and protocol
downgrade. The use of simple padding schemes alone is not
sufficient to mitigate traffic analysis attacks. However, padding
will organize a part of more complex mitigations for traffic
analysis attacks that are probably to be developed over time.
I summarizes the work in the literature as categorized above,
with example work, contributions, and open directions.
III. CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
Now we highlight various directions that pose challenges in
research on DNS: we call for more research based on data,
and data-driven analysis (III-A), privacy as a plug-in (III-B),
modeling adversaries (III-C), attack surface analyses (III-D),
and addressing the open resolvers phenomena (III-E).
A. More Data-driven Analysis for Security
There has been an abundance of work on DNS data analysis
for security, such as DNS behavior tracking, encryption, block-
ing, query name minimization, DNSSEC, DNS over TLS, the
DTLS for DNS exchange, etc. However, the DNS query traffic
has been increasing and the behavior of DNS usage and the
DNS ecosystem have been changing over time. DNS queries
can represent plenty of information. For example, an attacker
can build highly accurate profiles of what users do on the
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN THE LITERATURE, MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FOLLOW UP.
Area Topic Example work Main contribution Open direction
Ecosystem
analysis
DNS resolver behavior [8], [6], [31], [32],
[33], [34]
• DNS behavior tracking in a real-world setting • development
an analytical model for client interactions • exploring the
behavioral properties of domains using the DNS infrastructure
associated with the domain and the DNS lookup patterns
Behavior under DNS changes,
open resolvers
DNS blocking [35], [36], [37] • NXD request patterns analysis, blocking special queries How blocking affects privacy
DNS
security
Vulnerability analysis [38], [39], [40],
[41], [42], [43],
[44]
• measurement of the Internet’s vulnerability to DNS record
injection attacks • analysis of rogue DNS servers to create
malicious DNS resolution paths • analysis techniques for
hiding malicious DNS activities • evaluation of the cost-
effectiveness of mounting DNS rebinding attacks • removing
shared DNS resolvers • making DNS queries more resistant
to poisoning attacks
Best practices and incentives for
fixing vulnerabilities
Malicious domain detection [15], [45], [46],
[47], [34], [48],
[49], [50], [39],
[51], [17], [7], [52]
• detecting malware-related domain names by passively mon-
itoring DNS traffic • detecting unauthorized DNS root servers
using endpoint-based measurements • detecting domain fluxes
in DNS traffic by looking for patterns inherent to domain
names • dynamic reputation system using passive DNS query
data and zone features of domains • detecting unknown
malicious domain using temporal correlation in DNS queries
Addressing evasion and stealthi-
ness
Modeling adversaries [53], [11], [9] • modeling the cryptographic operations in DNSSEC • dis-
covering a forgery vulnerability
Mathematical modeling with stan-
dard adversaries
DNS Privacy Quantifying leakage [55], [18], [27],
[14], [26]
• quantifying queries and device names leak plenty of infor-
mation about users • analyzing the context obtained from the
prefetching queries, privacy-preserving query scheme (Range
Query) • exact setting representing a tradeoff between the
scope of potential leakage versus the number of possible
detections
Gap analysis of policy vs. reality
Privacy-preserving designs [27], [26], [56],
[57]
• concealing the actual queries using noisy traffic • PIR
techniques • PPDNS built on top of DHTs and computational
PIR
Rigorous analysis and evaluation
DNS encryption [56], [21], [24],
[12]
• lightweight privacy-preserving name resolution service
(EncDNS) • end-to-end encryption • T-DNS using TLS •
chains of trust from root servers to authoritative servers
How encryption meets privacy (and
how not)
Modeling adversaries [23], [30] • data-driven modeling and informal description • modeling
of adversaries against confidentiality
Modeling pervasive capabilities
(no prior work)
Standards [23], [58], [21],
[59], [60]
• connection-oriented DNS transport over TCP • DTLS for
DNS exchange • protection layer for the sensitive information
in DNS queries • padding scheme
Rigorous analysis of security, pri-
vacy, and trust
Internet by eavesdropping on query streams and ultimately
breaching a user’s privacy. Even more, some companies target
individual users and build profiles for them based on their
browsing seen in DNS traffic. They assemble such profiles
as part of their own commercial activities. Although efforts
to prevent this leakage have been ongoing, many problems
are still open. An understanding of the problem coupled with
previous developments in DNS is necessary. In addition, many
functions must be modified for the new DNS ecosystem and
further research using DNS data must be done for security.
B. Privacy as a Plug-in
With the increase in Internet usage, malicious invasion of
privacy using the DNS operation is on the rise. Techniques
such as query name minimization, DNSSEC, and DNS over
TLS, etc. to solve these problems exist, but a solution that sat-
isfies the requirements of privacy as a plug-in is lacking: such
solution should not require major modifications nor interfere
with the existing standards of DNS. For example, DNSSEC
allows users to verify DNS responses are correct, but does
not protect privacy. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates
opportunities for eavesdropping, but it is unclear what notions
of privacy it provides. DNSSEC and DNS over TLS are
independent and compatible protocols, although each solving
different problems. Thus, it is necessary to understand the
notions of privacy under various security models, and realizing
privacy as a plug-in to the DNS existing infrastructure by not
requiring major modifications.
C. Modeling Adversaries
Although previous studies have concentrated on DNS se-
curity and privacy, including data-driven modeling and the
infrastructure and investments made by the DNS providers,
little work is done on formalizing and understanding the notion
of pervasive adversaries. These pervasive adversaries have
been widely considered as a potential threat to the privacy
and security of communication on the Internet.
Modeling such adversaries would be the first challenge to
improve DNS privacy. We should be able to view adversaries
as either a passive adversary or an active adversary. A pas-
sive adversary does not interfere with the resolution and is
interested in associating queries with a user or a set of users.
He can eavesdrop on the links between the stub resolvers
and recursive resolvers, and the links between the recursive
resolvers and authoritative resolvers. An active adversary can
control over a recursive resolver. For example, it is a result
of the compromise of the software of that recursive resolver
or due to being the adversary’s recursive resolver such as
an open rogue resolver. Formalizing the advantage of the
adversaries would be the second challenge since the goal of the
adversaries is to breach the privacy of users. It is meaningful
to quantify their advantage in breaching the DNS privacy for
addressing the privacy issue. An extending formalization of the
capabilities of the adversaries using real-world DNS resolution
topology and DNS query data would be another challenge.
Some stub resolvers may generate more queries than others.
Thus, if such information is known by an adversary, the
adversary may use such distribution to associate a query with
a user more often than with another.
The last challenge is understanding the advantages of such
adversaries in light of various ongoing activities in the DNS
research community, which include: encryption, query name
minimization and blocking for DNS privacy. For example,
blocking mechanisms at either the browser, recursive, or
authoritative server can improve DNS privacy–but it must be
implemented at once in order to ensure privacy. In reality, it is
almost impossible that all browsers and recursive resolvers on
the Internet perform blocking at the same time. The diversity
of browsers and recursive software (even by the same vendor)
on the Internet today make it difficult to implement timely and
synchronized blocking. Thus, it is reasonable to assume only
a partial deployment of such recommendations. It should also
be noted that while a user can maintain their privacy through
DNS blocking, non-blocking users who share the same DNS
infrastructure may be inadvertently affected.
D. Attack Surface Analyses
The attack surface of the DNS resolution system is the entire
public Internet between the end user’s connection and the
public DNS service. The attack surface analysis is concerned
with enumerating potential and confirmed vulnerabilities, the
attacks those vulnerabilities can be used to launch, and the
implications of those attacks.
In the DNS resolution system, there are several potential
attacks for disrupting the resolution operation. There has been
a long history of attacks on the DNS ranging from Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks to targeted attacks requiring specialized
software. For example, an attacker can attack DNS resolvers
by exploiting vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow attacks
which make them misbehave or crash. Moreover, an attacker
can actually modify DNS resolver configuration files and re-
place the name server IP addresses with malicious IP addresses
to cause DoS attacks. These high-profile attacks have affected
various commercial companies, software vendors, websites,
content distribution services, and ISPs.
DNS amplification attacks utilize DNS servers for per-
forming bandwidth-consumption DoS attacks. An attacker can
“spoof” look-up requests to DNS servers to hide the source of
the exploit and direct the response to the target. Essentially, the
attacker turns a small DNS query into a much larger payload
directed at the target network.
With cache poisoning, an attacker can attempt to insert a
fake address record for an Internet domain into the DNS. If
the server accepts the fake record, the cache is “poisoned”
and subsequent requests for the address of the domain are
answered with the address of a server controlled by the at-
tacker. For as long as the fake entry is cached by the server, all
subscriber’s browsers or e-mail servers will automatically go
to the address provided by the compromised DNS server. DNS
cache poisoning attacks do not require substantial bandwidth
or processing, nor do they require sophisticated techniques.
Quantifying the attack surface of DNS is important in un-
derstanding and managing the DNS resolution system, thereby
improving DNS privacy. It identifies critical pieces of the
DNS system that need to be modified to withstand against
security threats. As aforementioned, evaluating the advantages
of various adversaries under blocking (at either the browser or
recursive resolver) and examining the difference between the
probabilities against the entities observed and controlled by
adversaries at the blocking point would be the challenge.
E. Addressing Open Resolvers
While open resolvers provide various benefits, such as
answering DNS requests from external sources for anything,
they currently pose a significant threat to the stability and
security of the Internet. Just recently, open resolvers have
been utilized for launching amplification attacks, calling for
initiating a systematic study on their population, use, and
distribution, and raising the awareness on their potential roles.
For example, the open resolver project [61] reported 32 million
open resolvers, 28 million of which pose a significant threat,
as of October 2013. However, little is done on understanding
the role each of those millions of resolvers plays, whether
they are open intentionally or accidentally, and other aspects
of their behavior.
One open problem today is to understand those resolvers
by perhaps analyzing their role, and understanding how they
contribute to the good and bad use of the DNS as a service.
Some of the open questions that are worth exploring—which
may shed light on the role each of those resolvers play—
include, among others, the following. 1) How well-represented
are the open resolvers in typical DNS resolution systems, e.g.,
in popular TLDs? 2) How persistent are open resolvers over
time in both the DNS resolution and open resolver ecosys-
tems? 3) Is there any correlation between the volumes of DNS
queries generated by those resolvers in the DNS resolution
system and their actual size in the open resolver ecosystem?
4) Do open resolvers “lie” about responses for queries initiated
by other clients? 5) Are open resolvers consistent in answering
various clients for the same type of query?
Other open questions concerning open resolvers could po-
tentially be answered through a characterization of those
resolvers, such as geographical distribution, and persistence
characterization over a longer period of time between con-
secutive scans, along with implications of the findings in
the main questions mentioned earlier. Ultimately, findings
systematically obtained through answering those questions
could help a reputation system of the open resolvers ecosystem
to guide benign users in their use of those resolvers.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we review various works on DNS ecosystem,
security issues, and privacy concerns. We point out the open
research problems related to DNS data-driven analysis, privacy
as a plug-in, modeling adversaries, and attack surface analyses.
We expect that these challenges and directions will continue
to be useful for improving DNS security and privacy.
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